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Structuralist Macroeconomics  
and the New Developmentalism  




Abstract. 	T h i s 	p a p e r 	f i r s t 	p r e s e n t s 	s o m e 	b a s i c 	i d e a s 	a n d 	m o d e l s 	o f 	a 	
structuralist	 development	 macroeconomics	 that	 complements	 and	
actualizes	the	ideas	of	the	structuralist	development	economics	that	was	





a	 long	 term	 disequilibrium,	 it	 is 	i n 	t h e 	c o r e 	o f 	d e v e l o p m e n t 	e c onomics.	
Second,	it	summarizes	“new	developmentalism”	–	a	sum	of	growth	policies	
based	 on	 these	 models	 and	 on	 the	 experience	 of	 fast‐growing	 Asian	
countries.	















o f 	t h o s e 	c o u n t r i e s 	s u b m i t t e d , 	o n e 	b y 	o n e , 	t o 	t h e 	p o l i c i e s 	o f 	l i beralization	 and	
deregulation	prescribed	by	the	neoliberal	consensus.	The	exceptions	were	the	fast‐












“new	 developmentalism”.	 The	 new	 ideas	 reflected,	 on	 one	 hand,	 the	 failure	 of	
neoliberal	reforms	to	promote	development	and	to	reduce	inequality,	and,	on	the	
other	 hand,	 the	 outdated	 nature	 of	 the	 old	 developmentalism	 given	 that	 many	
developing	countries	had	reached	a	more	advanced	stage	of	development.		
I n 	t h i s 	p a p e r 	m y 	p u r p o s e 	i s 	t o 	p r e s e n t 	t h e 	m a i n 	t h e s e s 	o f 	s t r u c turalist	
development	 macroeconomics	 and	 to	 compare	 them	 with	 the	 structuralist	
development	 economics	 that	 prevailed	 between	 the	 1940s	 and	 the	 1960s,	 and	
wh o s e	m o s t	im p o rtan t 	exp o ne nts 	were 	Pau l 	R o s ens t ei n‐ R o d an, 	R agnar	 Nurkse,	
Gunnar	Myrdal,	Raul	Prebisch,	Celso	Furtado,	Hans	Singer	and	Albert	Hirschman.1	
Structuralist development economics 




and	 economic	 development.	 Therefore,	 it	 views	 economic	 development	 as	 a	
complex	 process	 of	 structural	 change	 that	 is	 historically	 translated	 as	3	
 
“ i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ” , 	m e a n i n g 	t h e 	i n c r e a s e 	i n 	p r o d u c t i v i t y 	a s s o c iated	 with	 the	
continuous	 transference	 of	 labor	 to	 sectors	 producing	 more	 technologically	
sophisticated	 goods	 and	 services,	 with	 higher	 value‐added	 per	 worker,	 which	
require	 more	 educated	 and	 skilled	 labor	 and	 pay	 higher	 wages;	 that	 is	 also	
manifested	in	the	continuous	change	in	institutions	and	in	values	or	ideologies;	
and	 whose	 primary	 cause	 is	 capital	 accumulation	 with	 the	 incorporation	 of	
technical	progress.		
Second,	 structuralist	 development	 economics	 maintained	 that	 the	m a r k e t 	i s 	a n 	
excellent	 institution	 of	 economic	 coordination,	 but	 that	 economic	 development	
cannot	rely	exclusively	on	it.	In	the	background	there	is	always	a	nation	and	its	
corresponding	state,	determinedly	seeking	development	through	the	formulation	




Third,	 it	 was	 concerned	 with	 the	 lack	 of	 lucrative	 investment	 opportunities	
because,	 contrary	 to	 what	 happens	 in	 developed	 countries,	 the	 first	 industrial	
enterprises	to	be	installed	do	not	take	advantage	of	externalities	flowing	from	the	
existence	both	of	a	group	of	enterprises	oriented	toward	the	same	activity	and	of	

















S i x t h , 	a c c o r d i n g 	t o 	t h e 	c l a s s i c a l 	m o d e l 	o f 	A r t h u r 	L e w i s , 	a n 	u n limited	 supply	 of	
labor	from	an	economy’s	primary	and	traditional	sector	makes	industrialization	
p o s s ib l e	wi th 	a	s m al l 	inc re as e 	in 	wag es , 	b u t, 	fo r 	th is 	s am e	r eason,	 it	 creates	 a	
chronic	shortage	of	domestic	demand.		








deregulated	 financial	 markets,	 co m m o d i t i e s 	m a r k e t s 	o p e n e d , 	a n d 	developing	
countries	were	now	under	strong	pressure	from	the	Washington	Consensus	to	also	
open	their	financial	markets.	It	is	within	this	new	framework	that	structuralist	
development	 macroeconomics	 has	 emerged	 in	 the	 2000s.	 What	 does	 the	 new	
approach	retain	from	the	old	one?	A	large	portion	of	it.	However,	since	the	middle	

























i n v e s t m e n t 	o p p o r t u n i t i e s 	d u e 	t o 	a 	l a c k 	o f 	i n t e r n a l 	a n d 	e x t e r n a l 	d e m a n d , 	a n d , 	
consequently,	in	a	relatively	low	rate	of	investment	and	saving.			
According	 to	 this	 approach,	 two	 structural	 tendencies	 limit	 investment	
opportunities	 in	 developing	 countries:	 the	 tendency	 for	 wages	 to	 grow	 more	
s l o w l y 	t h a n 	p r o d u c t i v i t y 	a n d 	t h e 	t e n d e n c y 	t o 	t h e 	c y c l i c a l 	o v e r v aluation	 of	 the	
e x c h a n g e 	r a t e . 	T h e 	f i r s t 	t e n d e n c y , 	w h i c h 	h a s 	b e e n 	e m p h a s i z e d 	a n d	 widely	












imported	 goods;	 and	 third,	 because	 an	 increase	 in	 wages	 may	 reduce	 profit	
margins	(the	ratio	of	profit	to	sales),	but	if	it	causes	an	increase	in	the	purchasing	
power	of	the	domestic	market	that	is	proportionally	greater	than	the	decline	in	the	
p r o f i t 	m a r g i n , 	t h e 	p r o f i t 	r a t e 	m a y 	r i s e , 	a n d 	w e 	w i l l 	h a v e 	a 	wage‐led	g r o w t h 	
s t r a t e g y . 	O n 	t h e 	o t h e r 	h a n d , 	w e 	m u s t 	r e m e m b e r 	t h a t , 	i n 	t h e 	l o n g 	r u n , 	o n 	t h e 	
assumption	 of	 neutral	 technical	 progress,	 an	 increase	 in	 wages	 o f 	t h e 	s a m e 	
proportion	as	an	increase	in	productivity	encourages	investment	oriented	to	the	
d o m e s t i c 	m a r k e t , 	b e c a u s e 	t h e 	i n c r e a s e 	i n 	w a g e s 	i s 	c o m p a t i b l e 	w i th	 the	
maintenance	of	the	profit	rate	at	the	level	required	to	promote	the	investment	
provided	that	technical	capital	is	neutral	(the	output‐capital	relation	is	constant).	
W a g e ‐ l e d 	g r o w t h , 	h o w e v e r , 	d o e s 	n o t 	p r o f i t 	f r o m 	t h e 	m a j o r 	a d v a n t age	 of	 the	










and	 efficient	 enterprises	 in	 a	 developing	 country	 from	 having	 access	 to	 the	
international	market.	However,	if	the	developing	country	is	able	to	neutralize	this	
tendency	 and	 the	 exchange	 rate	 remains	 at	 a	 competitive	 level,	 its	 efficient	
enterprises	will	have	access	to	the	entire	external	demand.	In	this	case	we	have	an	






p r o p o s i t i o n s 	t h a t 	a r e 	r e l a t i v e l y 	n e w 	c o m p a r e d 	w i t h 	t h e 	K e y n e s i a n	 and	7	
 
structuralist	theses.2	The	first	thesis	states	that	the	exchange	rate	is	the	key	variable	







First,	 structuralist	 development	 macroeconomics	 maintains	 that	 a	 competitive	
exchange	rate	is	essential	for	economic	development,	because	it	works	as	a	sort	of	

















that	 become	 combined	 but	 that	 can	 be	 distinguished	 for	 better	 understanding.		
First,	the	Dutch	disease	pulls	the	exchange	rate	downwards3	or	appreciates	it	until	
it	reaches	the	current	equilibrium	level;	however,	it	stops	at	this	point,	because	the	
Dutch	 disease	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	 current	 account	 equilibrium . 	S e c o n d , 	a n d 	









o f‐ p aym ent 	c risi s	p u ts 	a	s to p 	to 	th e	p ro c ess .	Th ese 	e rr o neo u s	policies	are:	the	





confidence.	 At	 some	 point	 there	 occurs	 a	 sudden	 stop	 or	 a	 balance‐of‐payment	






as	 Corden	 and	 Neary	 in	 their	 original	 model	 (1982,	 1984),	 we	 assume	 two	
equilibrium	 exchange	 rates.	 The	 Dutch	 disease	 is	 an	 old	 problem,	 specific	 to	
monetary	economies,	but	it	received	this	name	because	it	was	identified	in	the	
Netherlands	in	the	1960s,	when	Dutch	economists	found	that	the	discovery	and	










The	 import	 duties	 that	 structuralist	 theory	 advocated	 were	 not,	 after	 all,	
particularly	 protectionist,	 but	 were	 an	 effective	 way	 of	 neutral i z i n g 	t h e 	D u t c h 	
disease	on	the	import	side,	since	the	duties	imply	a	devaluation	of	the	currency	for	
importers.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 those	 nations	 that	 subsidized	 the	 exports	 of	
industrial	goods	in	the	1970s	(such	as	Brazil	and	Mexico)	were	also	neutralizing	
the	Dutch	disease	on	the	export	side,	even	if	this	was	not	clear	to	them.	The	duties	
o n 	t h e 	o n e 	h a n d 	a n d 	t h e 	e x p o r t 	s u b s i d i e s 	o n 	t h e 	o t h e r , 	f r o m 	w h i ch	 the	









favors	 enterprises	 in	 the	 tradable	 sector	 using	 worldwide	 state‐of‐the‐art	
technology.	 On	 this	 definition,	 the	 Dutch	 disease	 is	 a	 market	 failure	 that,	 by	
damaging	the	prospects	of	efficient	and	technologically	sophisticated	enterprises,	








we	 do	 not	 draw	 a	 distinction	 here	 between	 the	 two	 concepts,	 both	 because	







the	 second	 category,	 countries	 that	 were	 able	 to	 industrialize	 for	 some	 time	
because,	 consciously	 or	 unconsciously,	 they	 neutralized	 the	 Dutch	 disease,	 but	
later	adopted	financial	opening,	lost	control	over	their	exchange	rates,	and	either	




Norway).	 Gabriel	 Palma	 (2005),	 using	 the	 terms	 defined	 by	 Robert	 Rowthorn	
(1994),	 points	 out	 that	 economic	 development	 follows	 a	 U‐curve	 regarding	





L a t i n 	A m e r i c a n 	c o u n t r i e s ) ; 	a n d 	h e	 defines	 the	 Dutch	 disease	 as	 premature	
deindustrialization,	as	an	“excess”	of	deindustrialization	existing	in	countries	rich	
in	natural	resources	that	are	not	able	to	prevent	premature	deindustrialization.	





equilibrium	 level.	 A	 competitive	 exchange	 rate,	 therefore,	 is	 equivalent	 to	 the	
industrial‐equilibrium	exchange	rate.	The	neutralization	of	the	Dutch	disease	is	
mainly	effected	through	the	imposition	of	a	variable	tax	or	levy	on	the	commodity	














i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y 	c o m p e t i t i v e 	t e c h n o l o g y . 	E v e n 	p a y i n g 	t h e 	t a x , 	t h e	 commodity	
producers	will	continue	to	have	the	same	profits;	it	is	the	country's	population	that	











rather	 than	 oil	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	 Dutch	 disease).	 This	 fund	 is	 necessary	
because	Dutch	disease	resulting	from	agricultural	goods	is	usually	not	serious;	the	
prices	 of	 such	 goods	 are	 highly	 unstable,	 and	 sometimes	 their	 decline	 makes	
production	unviable,	even	with	a	zero‐rated	tax	and	at	th e	current‐equilibrium	
exchange	rate,	and	it	becomes	necessary	to	subsidize	them.		
I f 	a 	D u t c h 	d i s e a s e 	c o u n t r y 	k e e p s 	t h e 	e x c h a n g e 	r a t e 	a r o u n d 	i t s 	i ndustrial	
equilibrium,	the	country	will	have	a	current‐account	surplus	and,	provided	that	it	
invests	the	resources	in	the	sovereign	fund,	a	fiscal	surplus.	Yet,	it	is	politically	not	



































domestic	 savings	 as	 the	 exchange	 rate	 appreciates.	 Why?	 On	 the	 income	 side,	
because	 the	 appreciation	 of	 the	 currency	 artificially	 increases	r e a l 	w a g e s , 	a n d , 	
given	a	high	marginal	propensity	to	consume,	increases	consumption	and	reduces	
domestic	 savings.	 On	 the	 demand	 side,	 the	 exchange‐rate	 appreciation	 reduces	
lucrative	 investment	 opportunities,	 export‐oriented	 investments	d e c l i n e , 	a n d 	
domestic	savings	decline.	In	both	cases,	foreign	savings	are	not	added	to	domestic	
savings	but	rather	replace	them.		










































particularly	 in	 middle‐class	 salaries.	 Consequently,	 the	 rate	 of	 substitution	 of	





for	 domestic	 savings,	 z	 , 	i s 	e q u a l 	t o 	1 	m i n u s 	t h e 	v a r i a t i o n 	i n 	t h e 	r a t e 	o f 	
investment	or	total	savings	divided	by	the	variation	in	the	rate	of	foreign	savings	in	
the	given	period.		
z = 1 – [(I/Y)t - (I/Y)(t-1)]/[(S/Y)t










f r o m 	t h e 	D u t c h 	d i s e a s e , 	w h i c h 	p u l l s 	t h e 	e x c h a n g e 	r a t e 	u p 	t o 	t h e 	 current	












of	 growth	 with	 indebtedness	 will	 be	 #0.60	 monetary	 units	 of	 the	c o u n t r y 	p e r 	
dollar.	
Public deficit 
Besides	 rejecting	 current‐account	 deficits,	 structuralist	 development	
macroeconomics,	 in	 this	 case	 opposed	 to	 vulgar	 Keynesianism,	 rejects	 chronic	
public	deficits	as	a	way	of	sustaining	demand	that	would	otherwise	be	chronically	
insufficient.	According	to	this	fifth	thesis,	chronic	public	deficits	financially	weaken	




challenged	 by	 its	 major	 representatives,	 but	 it	 was	 the	 subject	o f 	a 	s e r i o u s 	
distortion,	 as	 long	 as,	 particularly	 in	 Latin	 America	 in	 the	 1980s,	 vulgar	
Keynesianism	 criticized	 orthodox	 economists	 for	 defending	 fiscal	 responsibility	
and	proposed	chronic	fiscal	deficits	as	a	way	of	fighting	the	shortage	of	demand.	
Keynes	 distinguished	 between	 the	 current	 budget	 and	 the	 capital	b u d g e t , 	a n d 	
argued	 that	 the	 former	 should	 be	 in	 balance.7	 Recently,	 Robert	 Skidelsky,	 the	
remarkable	biographer	of	Keynes,	has	returned	to	the	subject	by	claiming	that	

















development	 macroeconomics	 is	 tha t 	t h e r e 	i s 	a 	t e n d e n c y 	t o 	t h e 	c yclical	
overvaluation	of	the	exchange	rate.	Whereas	for	the	conventional	and	Keynesian	
theories	 it	 is	 still	 the	 market	 that	 controls	 the	 exchange	 rate,	 for	 structuralist	
development	macroeconomics	this	role	is	performed	by	the	balance‐of‐payment	
crisis;	if	the	country	does	not	manage	its	exchange	rate,	if	it	lets	it	float	in	a	really	
free	 way,	 the	 country	 will	 experience	 successive	 balance‐of‐payment	 crises.	 In	17	
 
Figure	 1,	 the	 ordinate	 represents	 the	 exchange	 rate	 in	 terms	 of	d o m e s t i c 	
currency/reserve	currency,	so	that	the	lower	the	position	in	the	exchange	rate	
curve,	the	more	appreciated	is	the	domestic	currency.		




1	 we	 have	 three	 basic	 lines:	 two	 horizontal	 lines,	 one	 line	 for	t h e 	c u r r e n t ‐
equilibrium	 exchange	 rate	 and	 another	 one	 for	 the	 industrial‐equilibrium	
exchange	rate,	and	a	third	blue	line	that	depicts	the	actual	exchange	rate.	The	story	
































m a j o r 	a p p r e c i a t i o n . 	B u t , 	s i n c e 	t h e 	D u t c h 	d i s e a s e 	i s 	c o m p a t i b l e 	w i t h 	t h e 	i n t e r ‐
temporal	equilibrium	of	the	current	account,	the	appreciation	it	causes	stops	there.	
Afterwards,	the	exchange	rate	continues	to	appreciate	and	enters	the	area	of	the	
c u r r e n t ‐ a c c o u n t 	d e f i c i t 	d u e 	t o 	e x c e s s i v e 	o r 	u n n e c e s s a r y 	c a p i t a l 	i n f l o w s . 	T h e 	
s t r u c t u r a l 	c a u s e 	o f 	t h i s 	s e c o n d 	movement	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 market	 profits	 and	
interest	 are	 higher	 in	 developing	 countries.	 More	 significant,	 however,	 are	 the	
economic	policy	causes	that	encourage	the	capital	inflows.	Not	only	the	growth	







the	 increase	 in	 foreign	 debt	 are	 easily	 financed,	 because	 foreign	 creditors	 are	













c e n t u r y , 	h a v i n g 	a s 	i t s 	p a r a d i g m 	t h e 	f a s t ‐ g r o w i n g 	A s i a n 	c o u n t r i e s.8	I t 	i s 	b e s t 	
p r e s e n t e d 	b y 	c o m p a r i s o n 	w i t h 	t h e 	o l d 	d e v e l o p m e n t a l i s m 	a n d , 	l a t e r,	 with	 the	19	
 




development	 strategy	 is	 intended	 for	 poor	 countries,	 whereas	 the	 new	
developmentalism	is	intended	for	middle‐income	countries.	The	first	difference	–	
between	 import‐substitution	 industrialization	 and	 export‐led	 industrialization	 –	
well	reflects	this	fact.	The	new	developmentalism	defends	the	export‐led	model	







Table 1: Old developmentalism and new developmentalism 
Old developmentalism  New developmentalism 
 
1. State-oriented industrialization, based 
on import substitution. 
1. Export-oriented industrialization, 
combined with mass consumption on the 
domestic market.  
2. State’s key role in obtaining forced 
savings and making investments.  
2. It is the state’s duty to create 
investment opportunities and reduce 
economic inequalities.  
3. The industrial policy is a key issue. 
 
3. The industrial policy is subsidiary but 
strategic. 
4. Ambiguity about public and current 
account deficits.  
4. Rejection of both public and current 
account deficits. If the country has the 
Dutch disease, it should achieve  a fiscal 
surplus and a current-account surplus.  
5.  A certain complacency regarding 
inflation. 







resources	 and	 the	 entrepreneurial	 capacity	 to	 implement	 a	 good	 part	 of	 the	
necessary	investments.	On	the	same	lines,	for	the	old	developmentalism	industrial	
policy	was	central;	in	the	new	developmentalism	it	is	still	significant	but	strategic,	
and	 must	 be	 applied	 to	 specific	 sectors	 and	 to	 enterprises	 able	t o 	c o m p e t e 	
internationally.		
The	new	developmentalism	is	not	protectionist,	but	simply	emphasizes	the	need	for	
a	 competitive	 exchange	 rate,	 which	 it	 identifies	 as	 the	 industrial‐equilibrium	
exchange	 rate.	 It	 assumes	 that	 medium‐development	 countries	 have	 already	
progressed	beyond	the	infant	industry	stage,	but,	besides	the	problem	of	excessive	
capital	inflow,	they	face	the	problem	of	the	Dutch	disease,	and	therefore	they	need	











take	 into	 account	 future	 comparative	 advantages,	 they	 will	 effectively	 promote	
economic	growth.	
Conventional orthodoxy and new developmentalism 
In	order	to	compare	the	new	developmentalism	with	conventional	orthodoxy,	we	
can	 differentiate	 development	 strategies	 from	 the	 strategies	 of	m a c r o e c o n o m i c 	
stability,	even	though	they	are	closely	connected.	Let’s	begin	with	the	differences	






m a r k e t 	f u n d a m e n t a l i s m , 	w h i c h 	a r e 	o f 	i n t e r e s t 	n o t 	t o 	d e v e l o p i n g 	countries	 but	
rather	to	their	competitors	in	the	framework	of	globalization	–	the	rich	countries.	
Table 2: Conventional orthodoxy and new developmentalism (growth) 
Conventional orthodoxy  New developmentalism 
 
1. There is no economic role for the 
nation.  
1. The nation is the agent responsible for 
the definition of a national development 
strategy.  
2. The fundamental institution for growth 
is the guarantee of property rights and 
contracts.  
2. The key institution for growth is a 
national development strategy. 
3. Reforms should reduce the size of the 
state and deregulate markets. 
3. Reforms should strengthen the state and 
markets – and the latter should be well 
regulated.  
4. The state should not implement an 
industrial policy or a policy of 
redistribution. 
4. Industrial policy should be limited and 
strategic, and play a major role in 
income distribution. 
5. There are no structural tendencies to be 
neutralized. 
5. The tendency to currency overvaluation 
and the tendency of wages to grow 
more slowly than productivity should 
be neutralized.  
6. Growth should be financed largely by 
foreign savings. 





developmentalism	 states	 that,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 widespread	 competition	 that	
characterizes	globalization,	the	fundamental	agent	of	economic	development	is	the	
n a t i o n , 	b e c a u s e 	i t 	i s 	u p 	t o 	t h e 	n a t i o n 	– 	t h e 	s o c i a l 	c l a s s e s 	a g r eeing	 reasonably	
among	themselves	–	to	define	a	national	development	strategy	or	a	strategy	of	











Good	 markets,	 efficient	 markets	 are	 regulated	 markets.	 Whereas	 conventional	
orthodoxy	acknowledges	market	failures,	but	affirms	that	the	failures	of	the	state	












should	 be	 strong	 or	 efficient	 because	 it	 is	 the	 nation’s	 instrument	 of	 collective	
action	par	excellence.	
In	order	to	ensure	the	control	of	the	exchange	rate,	the	new	developmentalism	














Table 3: Conventional orthodoxy and the new developmentalism (macro) 
Conventional orthodoxy  New developmentalism 
7. The Central Bank has a sole mandate: low 
inflation. The rest of the administration 
should pursue other goals. 
7. The government and the Central Bank have 
three mandates:  low inflation, balanced 
exchange rate and full employment. 
8. The fiscal standard should be defined in 
terms of primary surplus. 
8. The fiscal standard should be defined more 
rigorously in terms of public deficit and 
public savings. 
9. The exchange rate should be floating: no 
target or policy for the exchange rate. 
9. The exchange rate should be floating but 
managed; the target is the industrial-
equilibrium exchange rate. 
10. The Central Bank and the government 
each have a sole mandate: to determine, 
respectively, the short-term interest rate 
and fiscal policy. 
10. The Central Bank and the government 
may, in addition, buy reserves, impose 
capital controls, etc.  
11. An income policy is not required or 
desirable. 
11. Minimum wage and minimum-income 
policies should contribute to ensuring that 
wages grow as fast as productivity.  
For	the	new	developmentalism	medium‐term	domestic	financing	is	essential	for	
d e v e l o p m e n t , 	a n d 	i t 	i s 	t h e 	s t a t e ’ s 	r o l e 	t o 	e n s u r e 	i t 	t h r o u g h 	i ts	 own	 banks	 and	
private	banks.	Foreign	financing,	however,	is	undesirable,	since	it	appreciates	the	




mean	 that	 the	 new	 developmentalism	 is	 against	 foreign	 direct	 investment;	 its	
opposition	is	to	current	account	deficits.	It	is	perfectly	possible	for	a	country	to	
benefit	from	the	technology	introduced	by	direct	investment	without	using	that	




is	 the	 need	 for	 macroeconomic	 stability.	 	 But	 whereas	 conventional	 orthodoxy	
ultimately	restricts	the	concept	of	stability	to	the	control	of	public	expenditure	and	
inflation,	 the	 new	 developmentalism	 applies	 it	 more	 broadly	 to	 include	 the	
stability	of	asset	prices	or	the	control	of	financial	bubbles,	balance‐of‐payments	
equilibrium,	and	reasonably	full	employment.		





level	 compatible	 with	 the	 stability	 of	 the	 balance	 of	 payments	 and	 with	 the	





f o r 	t h a t 	r e a s o n , 	b e c a u s e 	i t 	i s 	c h r o n i c a l l y 	o v e r v a l u e d , 	t h e 	e x c h ange	 rate	 in	
developing	countries	should	be	floating	but	managed.	A	variable	tax	on	exports	of	
commodities	originating	the	Dutch	disease,	the	formal	rejection	of	current	account	
deficits,	 capital	 controls,	 and	 buying	 of	 international	 reserves	 are	 the	 main	
instruments	that	policymaker	dispose	to	manage	the	exchange	rate.		
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1 The economic literature usually refers to the theory developed by these economists as 
“development economics” and, as a subgroup, calls “structuralist” the Latin American school 
that developed around the ideas of Raul Prebisch and Celso Furtado.  However, since the 
expression “development economics” is too general, and since all said economists adopted a 
structural concept of development related to industrialization, I have decided to adopt the 
expression “structuralist development economics” to refer to this school of thought as a whole. 
2 These theses and, more broadly, structuralist development macroeconomics and the new 
developmentalism are discussed in Globalization and Competition (Bresser-Pereira 2010). This 
book makes use of several previous papers, among which it is worth mentioning Bresser-Pereira 
and Gala (2007) and Bresser-Pereira (2008).  
3 An exchange rate is measured by dividing the domestic currency by the dollar or (as is usually 
done in developing countries) by a currency basket. 
4 Celso Furtado, for instance, in a 1957 report on the Venezuelan economy, practically defined 
the Dutch disease. This report was recently published by Centro Celso Furtado and Editora 
Contraponto (Furtado 1956 [2008]). 
5 For instance, in Brazil in the 1970s, the average import duty was 50% and the export subsidy 
on manufactured goods was also 50% on average. This way, the agricultural goods that did not 
have a subsidy paid a “disguised tax” of 33.3% on the exported price. 
6 Variable, because the tax should vary according to the variations of the international price of 
the commodity. 
7 John Maynard Keynes, Collected Writings, vol. XXVII, chapter 5. 
8 In 2010 a group of development economists and macroeconomists debated and approved the 
Ten Theses on New Developmentalism.  These  are now available at 
www.tenthesesonnewdevelomentalism.org in several languages, with the name of their 
sponsors. 
9 On flexsecurity see Robert Boyer (2006). 